Mr. President, I rise

today in strong support of the legislation

before us. This legislation is only

one of many important steps required

to counter the greatest threat to U.S.

security in this era—the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction.

I am not being an alarmist. I am

being a realist. The proliferation of nuclear,

chemical, and biological technologies

and the means to deliver them

present a growing threat to U.S. security.

This is a threat which we have

only begun to address in the changed

security environment of the 21st century.

Mr. President, I would like to mention

three important aspects of the

problem as stated by George Tenet, the

Director of Central Intelligence, before

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

early in February.

First, Russia and China no longer

represent the only missile threat to the

United States. The missile threat to

U.S. interests and forces from other nations

is here and now.

Second, South Asian nations are establishing

doctrine and tactics for the

use of their missiles and weapons of

mass destruction. The nuclear rivalry

between India and Pakistan steadily

intensifies. The potential for miscalculation,

misperception and escalation

of the conflict in Kashmir is

high.

Third, the countries we previously

considered technology importers are

now assuming roles as ‘‘secondary suppliers.’’

This compounds the proliferation

problem and confounds our ability

to control or defend against it.

As outlined in the most recent Intelligence

Community assessment of Ballistic

Missile Threats, by the year 2015

the U.S. will not only face the ongoing

challenges of large-scale missile

threats from China and Russia. U.S.

cities will also confront a real threat

from other actors—North Korea, probably

Iran, and possibly Iraq.

One must mention that Intelligence

Community’s estimate excludes the

possibility of social or political

changes in those countries that would

change the calculus. Also, the missile

arsenals of these nations would be

much smaller, limited to smaller payloads,

and less reliable than Chinese or

Russian capabilities.

At the same time, these remain a lethal

and less predictable threat. Acute

accuracy is not required for missiles

tipped with nuclear, biological, or

chemical warheads. And the U.S. cannot

bank on rational actions from dictators

like Saddam Hussein or Kim

Chong-il.

At the same time that the threat increases,

global changes make non-proliferation

efforts even more difficult.

Three specific aspects in the current

international security environment

will impede U.S. efforts to control or

minimize this threat.

First, Russia—hard currency starved

and heavily indebted—is a willing merchant—

most notably of conventional

defense items, but the U.S. Russian

sales are not limited to this. This legislation

attempts to address this aspect

through creating incentives for the

Russian government and others to implement

and enforce stricter export

controls on private actors or institutes

in their dealings with Iran.

Second, North Korea and their No-

Dong missile sales are altering strategic

balances in the Middle East and

Asia. While the administration’s new

strategy for engagement with North

Korea may retard developments that

require testing, such as reliability of

long-range missiles, many suspect that

the North Korean missile program continues

and that its role as a supplier of

medium-range missile technology has

not been addressed.

Third, technology advances and rapid

international economic integration

alter and confuse the means by which

the United States can control military

advances of other nations. The list of

potentially threatening dual-use technologies

continues to grow. This is especially

true of information technologies—

command, control, communication,

and information technologies,

C–31, now comprise about 75

percent of a modern military’s capability.

But potential dual use is also

true of nuclear, chemical, biological,

and missile technologies.

The proliferation threat will remain

our Nation’s No. 1 security challenge in

the 21st century. At the same time, the

United States will be most vulnerable

to this threat. As George Tenet, our

head of the CIA, also noted, U.S. hegemony

has become a lightning rod for

the disaffected.

As Americans enjoy unprecedented

prosperity, many in the world remain

disaffected. These disaffected represent

a group who resent our power and our

prosperity. Our success fuels the intensity

of their claims and their feelings.

The same forces aligned against our

nonproliferation objectives apply to

terrorist organizations as well, whether

state sponsored or not. A disaffected

Iran, despite some moderating trends,

remains an active state supporter of

terrorism.

Terrorist groups will continue to increase

their destructive or their potential

for disruption through rapidly

evolving and spreading technologies.

Again, chemical, biological, radiological,

and nuclear agents offer cheap

means to achieve highly lethal terror.

Acquisition of information technology

may not only greatly improve a terrorist

group’s means for organization

and coordination and attack, these

technologies offer increasing potential

for massive, possibly crippling, disruption

of U.S. information infrastructure.

This legislation is a small step, but a

good one, in addressing the problem of

supplying WMD technologies to Iran.

But we have much more work to do. We

must prevent, when prevention is possible,

such as providing safeguards for

nuclear materials in Russia and controlling

access to technology and

know-how as best we can and in as

many cases as we can.

We must also find the most effective

means to defend against such threats,

such as training and equipping policemen

and firemen to respond to these

attacks and pursuing the best technological

solutions to defend against

them.

I believe the United States is not

pursuing with sufficient vigor the

means of greatest potential against

missile threats. For example, directed

energy technologies represent the next

revolutionary step in military technologies.

Laser technologies in particular

dramatically alter U.S. potential

to counter a missile attack. Missile

defense at the speed of light will

improve effectiveness and efficiency,

substantially reducing the cost-per-kill

ratios.

Despite this understanding, the budget

of the President cut the airborne

laser program $92 million. In addition,

the defense budget reduced science and

technology spending, according to our

first estimates, by more than $1 billion.

It is not easy to understand. The administration

proposes sacrificing the

potential of real defense against proliferation

threats, although it seems

very clearly to be a shortsighted approach.

I have been working as hard as I can,

and in some instances at the forefront,

on some prevention efforts, especially

with respect to proliferation threats

from Russia. I hope this year for

stepped up measures of prevention, especially

regarding the threat of nuclear

proliferation in the form of the brain

drain from Russia. At the same time,

where I can, I will put on a full court

press to improve the science and technology

budget for the Pentagon, especially

as it pertains to the most promising

means of missile defense and directed

energy.

I hope my colleagues will join in ensuring

that every means of proliferation

prevention is pursued. I also invite

my colleagues to join in increasing the

means of our military laboratories to

provide for our national defense.

I yield the floor.